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Subjects purchased information to increase P (probability of a correct 
decision) in tasks with net expected value held constant. In Experiment 1, 
Ss purchased more information, and thereby increased P, when stakes were 
higher. Experiment 2 showed a positive relation between stakes and P re- 
gardless of which variable was independent. The hypothesis that Ss were 
holding variance constant could not account for this tradeoff, however, be- 
cause Ss treated P as relatively more important than stakes. Finally, under 
the assumption that risk increases with stakes and decreases with P, the 
riskier Ss treated P as relatively more important than did the less risky Ss. 
A decision maker can frequently increase the probability of making a 
correct decision by obtaining information pertaining to the states of 
nature relevant to tha t  decision. However, such information is costly in 
terms of time, effort, or money. A class of models within statistical de- 
cision theory is devoted to the problem of the amount of information that  
should be purchased when costly information will increase the probability 
of a correct decision. These models provide a means for finding the optimal 
amount of information to purchase; the number of data that  will maxi- 
mize the net expected value of the decision. 
Figure 1 shows how the expected value of a decision varies as the 
number of data purchased N increases. Although the results of Fig. 1 are 
derived for a specific ease, the forms of the functions are typical. In  this 
ease, the decision maker has the task of deciding whether a population 
proportion is 0.6 or 0.4. The prior probability of each proportion is one- 
half. The decision maker pays .0125 dollars for each datum sampled from 
the population, wins one dollar if his decision is correct, and loses one dol- 
lar if he is incorrect. The gross expected value is the expected value of the 
decision without regard to the cost of data. Since data sampled will in- 
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FIG. 1. Relations between gross expected value, net expected value, variance, and 
cost as a function of the number of data purchased. 
crease the probabil i ty of being correct at a decreasing rate, the gross ex- 
pected value of the decision increases rapidly at  first and then asymptotes 
at one dollar. The cost function indicates the increase in the cost of data  
as a function of N. Since each datum costs a constant amount, this 
function is linear. The net expected value (E¥)  function is equal to the 
gross expected value minus the cost of the data. This function increases 
to a maximum and then decreases. I t  is optimal to purchase the number 
of data associated with the maximum of the net EV function. 
An important  characteristic of this function is tha t  it is very flat in 
a broad region around its maximum. Moderate  deviations from the opti- 
mal N result in only a relatively small decrement in the net expected 
value of the decision. Schlaifer has pointed out tha t  in a wide class of 
situations, " . . . a moderate error in sample size is of no practical im- 
portance whatever - -a  sample which is 10 percent above or below optimum 
cannot increase expected total  loss by  as much as 6/10 of 1 percent" 
(Schlaifer, 1961, p. 337). This flatness in the region of the optimum is 
a general characteristic of information purchase tasks, so EV cannot be 
a very  importanb determinant of how much information should be pur- 
chased within the general range of the optimum. 
I t  is therefore important  to isolate which variables, if any, determine 
N in the region where net EV is relatively constant. One obvious candi- 
date is stakes. Previous research has shown bha~ subiects increase N as 
stakes increase and when the cost of data is held eonstanb (Peterson & 
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Beach, 1967). But in that case, EV is tied to stakes. Experiment 1 un- 
tied those two variables; the cost of data within each level of stakes was 




Experimental design. The Ss purchased samples of data from a bi- 
nomial population for the purpose of deciding whether the population 
proportion was .60 or .40. Each S won X dollars for a correct decision 
and lost X dollars for an incorrect decision. In order to vary dispersion 
over a wide range, X took on values of .10, 25, .50, 1.00, 2.00, and 5.00. 
In order to hold EV constant at zero to the nearest cent, the cost of 
data increased as a negatively accelerated function of N. Specifically, 
the cost of any sample size was equal to the gross E~  for that sample 
size. The Ss could purchase zero data or any odd number from 1 to 47. 
Apparatus. The S faced a panel of two columns of lights. Each column 
contained 24 pairs of red and green bulbs, with a button between the 
members of each pair. Pushing the button for a particular N caused the 
appropriate bulbs of the first N pairs to light. For each pair, the color 
of the light represented the datum that was sampled randomly with re- 
placement from the selected population. A plugboard behind the panel 
controlled which bulb in each of the 48 pairs would light. Forty-six 
different plugboards represented 23 independent samples and their mirror 
images. Thus, insertion of a different plugboard caused a different se- 
quence of bulbs to light. Below the sample display were two decision 
buttons corresponding to the two different binomial populations. Pushing 
either decision button lit the bulb corresponding to the correct population 
proportion. 
Procedure. The E instructed S about the nature of the information- 
purchase task and the apparatus. He further indicated that the task was 
structured such that some Ss may win and others lose, but the average 
winnings should be about zero. The E described the six different levels 
of stakes and pointed out a display of the cost function associated with 
each level. On each trial the E selected a population proportion by 
inserting a randomly selected plug into the apparatus. The S then pur- 
chased a sample of data by pushing the appropriate button. After 
observing the outcome of that sample he made his prediction of the 
population proportion by pushing the desired button and then received 
immediate feedback about whether he was right or wrong. The E then in- 
formed the S of the current total of his wins or losses. 
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Each block of six trials included all six levels of stakes presented in 
a random order. Because of the magnitude of the money involved, which 
included wins or losses of up to $5.00, the range of the amounts that Ss 
could win or lose was too large to be acceptable for Ss from a college 
studen~ population. This range was lowered by the following procedure, 
about which Ss were not informed. If any S was winning more than $8.00 
he faced unfavorable sequences in which the undiagnostic plugs, which 
pointed least strongly to the correct population or even to the incorrect 
population, were systematically associated with high stakes. If, on the 
other hand, the S was losing more than $2.00 he faced a favorable se- 
quence in which the diagnostic plugs were associated with the high stakes 
and the undiagnostie plugs with the low stakes. Otherwise, S encountered 
a neutral sequence for which diagnostieity was not related to stakes. 
Most of the time Ss operated in the neutral sequence. A post-experimental 
interview was conducted to learn whether any of the Ss suspected that 
the process of selecting plugs was in any way not random. Two of the 
Ss indicated that they were suspicious of the procedure. 
Each S participated in eleven blocks of six trials unless he was too 
far ahead or behind with respect to his winnings. In that ease he con- 
tinued participating in the experiment until his winnings fell in the range 
of 80 to $6.00. Ss were not informed before the experiment about how 
many trials in which they would have to participate. 
Subjects. Twenty-four men students at the University of Michigan 
served as Ss individually. They were paid $1.50 an hour plus their win- 
nings in the experiment. The Ss volunteered with the knowledge that it 
was possible to lose some of their own money in the experiment. A large 
proportion of the Ss who were initially contacted to participate in the 
experiment refused because of the possibility of losing their own money. 
This selection factor may have led to Ss with higher than average levels 
of preferred risk. Ten of the Ss were graduate students and fourteen were 
undergraduates. 
RESULTS 
The results displayed in Fig. 2 indicate that N increases with the level 
of stakes. These results were obtained by first calculating the mean N 
purchased by each S within each level of stakes. Means and their stand- 
ard errors were then calculated across Ss and are displayed in Fig. 2. 
The first four blocks of trials were a priori designated as practice trials 
and are thus omitted from the data analysis. The results displayed are 
based on the remaining complete blocks of trials. The number of blocks 
analyzed ranged from seven to twelve for the different Ss. 
Figure 2 shows that the mean N increased almost linearly as a function 
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FI~. 2. Means and standard deviations as a function of the logarithm of the 
stakes. 
of the log of the stakes. This linear relation held for most of the indi- 
vidual Ss. The median correlation between N and log stakes was .87; 
nine of the Ss had correlations of more than .90 and only three were 
negative. The two Ss who indicated that they were suspicious of the ex- 
perimental procedure are two of the three with negative correlations. The 
correlation between log stakes and N was higher than that between stakes 
and N for 17 of 24 Ss. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 1 show that most Ss increase N in response 
to increased stakes, even when EV is held constant. The direction of this 
effect is consistent with the hypothesis that each person strives to main- 
tain the variance of his decisions at a relatively constant level. Several 
experiments of the choice-among-bets type have investigated the specific 
hypothesis of variance preference (e.g., Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Lichten- 
stein, 1967; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Edwards, 1965). Some of the results 
have been positive, but the evidence is generally inconclusive. 
In a sitnation where S wins A dollars with probability P and otherwise 
wins B dollars, the variance of the decision is P(1 --  P) ( A -  B) 2. Figure 
1 illustrates how the variance decreases with N when stakes are constant 
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in that situation. The hypothesis that Ss maintain an ideal level of 
variance implies that any change in variance away from that ideal caused 
by a change in stakes will lead S to compensate by a corresponding 
change in P so as to bring variance bask to his preferred level. This 
requires the directional ~radeoff between P and stakes found in Experi- 
ment 1. However, the tradeoff that occurred was not large enough. Sub- 
jects did not increase N (and thus P) as much in response to changed 
stakes as would Ss holding variance constant. 
There are at least two reasons why an S who was attempting to hold 
variance constant would fail to increase N sufficiently in response to 
increased stakes. One reason is that he might not know the appropriate 
relation between N and P. Even if he understands that P increases mono- 
tonically with N, he may assume that the increase is steeper than it 
actually is. Further, Ss may have been only partially sensitive to manipu- 
Iations of the independent variable. Several experiments on decision 
making have demonstrated such partial sensitivity on the part of Ss 
(Peterson & Beach, 1967). Either of these reasons could account for 
the failure of Experiment 1 to support the variance-preference hypothesis. 
Therefore, Experiment 2 was designed to increase the transparency of 
P and to measure the amount of partial sensitivity to changes in stakes. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In an effort to make the probability of winning more transparent, 
Experiment 2 required S to purchase a single datum at his selected bag 
composition rather than to determine P by deciding how many data to 
purchase. Thus, for example, S could select a P of 90% by purchasing 
a single datum sampled from a population characterized by 90% blue 
chips and 10% red chips. The cost of the sample increased with P such 
that EV was constant at zero. 
A switching of independent with dependent variables served to control 
for the problem of partial sensitivity. 'The E set the level of stakes on 
even-numbered trials and the Ss selected the level of diagnostieity within 
which to purchase his information. On odd numbered trials the E specified 
the level of diagnostieity and the S responded by selecting a level of 
stakes at which he wished to play the game. In order to make it possible 
for S to hold variance at a constant level, the diagnostic values ranged 
from a F of 0.5 to a P of 1.0. The cost of information equalled the gross 
EV making the net EV of any  game zero. 
METHOD 
Experimental design. The experiment was divided into a practice ses- 
sion with imaginary stakes, and another session played for real money. 
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During both sessions E determined either P or stakes and S responded 
with stakes or P, respectively. The E then drew a poker chip from a 
bookbag with the predominant proportion equal to P, and S decided 
which color of chip was predominant, red or blue. The remaining pro- 
cedure was similar to Experiment 1. 
Apparatus. Each of the four bookbags used in practice sessions con- 
tained fifty poker chips with either red or blue predominant. The pro- 
portion of predominant chips P was either .60 or .70. Other apparatus 
included displays of the population proportions, an adding machine to 
keep track of wins and losses, and answer sheets on which each S re- 
corded his decisions. 
Procedures. The E acquainted S with the nature of the game by means 
of 68 practice trials with imaginary money. During the practice trials, 
E specified either P or stakes and S responded with his desired stake or 
P. During the trials with real money, E specified each P and each stake 
at least once again in random order. Stakes took on values of $.10, $.25, 
$.50, $1.00, $2.00, and $5.00. The P took on the values .50, .60, .70, .80, .85, 
.90, .93, .96, .98, .99, and 1.0. There were many P's in the range of .90 to 
1.0 because large changes in variance take place in this range as com- 
pared to, for example, the .50-.60 range. The actual sampling process 
had been completed by E prior to the experiment by sampling from the 
appropriate binomial population. This was explained to each S and no 
one objected or indicated suspicion. As in Experiment 1 it was possible 
for Ss to get either too far ahead or behind. Accordingly, neutral, favor- 
able, and unfavorable sequences were used i t / a  manner similar to that 
of Experiment 1. Each S played until his winnings were in the acceptable 
range. The number of real-money trials varied from a necessary mini- 
mum of 17 to a maximum of 40. 
Subjects. Twenty-five men students at the University of Michigan 
served as Ss. They responded to invitations sent from a subiect pool. 
Each S was informed of the possibility of losing some of his own money. 
RESULTS 
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that subiects strive to maintain 
an ideal or fixed level of variance. If that level is K, then 
P(1 - -  P ) ( A  - -  B )  ~ = K .  ( 1 )  
By taking logs and transposing variables, Eq. 2 specifies the following 
linear relation between probabilities and stakes 
log(P(1 -- P)) = log K -- 2(log(A -- B)). (2) 
Note that P(1 --  P) is a maximum when P = .5 and decreases as P a p -  
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proaches one or zero. Equation 2 implies that each unit increase in log 
(A -- B) will be compensated for by a corresponding two-unit decrement 
in l o g ( P ( 1 - - P ) ) .  Thus, the constant variance hypothesis implies a 
negative correlation between l o g ( P ( 1 - - P ) )  and log(A--B)  for each 
S; the best fitting regression line should have a slope of --2.0. 
Of the 24 Ss who completed the experiment (one refused to play for 
real money), 21 exhibited negative correlations, eleven of which were 
more extreme than --.85. Of the Ss without extreme negative correlations, 
the most risky S always chose a P of .5 or stakes of $5.00; two Ss dis- 
played positive correlations; and others rather consistently chose some 
constant intermediate level of probability or stakes. 
The 11 Ss characterized by extreme negative correlations yielded an 
interesting pattern of results. Contrary to the partial sensitivity found 
in previous experiments, the slope of the regression line was essentially 
independent of whether P or stakes was the dependent variable. The 
correlation between regression slopes in the two conditions was .87. Slopes 
were slightly more negative when P was independent; the mean difference 
was only --.10. The regression slopes ranged between --.13 and --.84, sub- 
stantially flatter than the --2.0 predicted by the constant variance model. 
As compared with that model, Ss treated probability of winning as rela- 
tively more important than slakes. 
Not only were the slopes flatter than prescribed by the constant 
variance model, but the degree of flatness depended upon both the mean 
log (A -- B) and the mean log P(1 --  P). The .correlation of slope with the 
mean log(A -- B) was .90 when stakes comprised the dependent variable; 
the correlation of slope with mean log P ( 1 -  P) was .85 when P was the 
dependent variable. Thus, Ss who chose high log(A- -B)  or high log 
P(1 -- P) tended to have flatter slopes. 
DISCUSSION 
As expected, most Ss compensated for increases in stakes by paying 
relatively more for information by purchasing either more data or a 
more diagnostic datum. One interpretation of this behavior is that there 
is a tendency to maintain risk at some constant, intermediate level. There 
is little agreement in the literature about what comprises risk, but we are 
willing to assume that it increases with stakes and according as the 
probability of a correct terminal decision decreases. If so, when the ex- 
perimenter changed risk by manipulating an independent variable the 
Ss responded by changing risk in the  opposite direction on the dependent 
variable. 
Previous investigators have proposed variance as a measure of risk 
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and also that each person has a variance preference, i.e., he prefers to 
maintain variance at some fixed level. However, the present results sug- 
gest that, even though the components of variance, P(I- P) and A --B, 
may contribute to risk, Ss may combine them in some way other than 
specified by the variance. That is, Ss may tend toward holding risk con- 
stant, but may perceive risk as some measure of dispersion other than 
variance. This interpretation is strengthened by results of previous re- 
search in which some model other than the mean square deviation ac- 
counts for Ss' estimates of relative variability (Beach & Scopp, 1968; 
I-Iofstatter as reported in Brunswik, 1956). The best-fitting exponent of 
the deviations is typically less than 2; in fact , it is usually less than i. 
In contrast to the interpretation of the variance measure, estimates of 
perceived variability tend to be more sensitive to differences in variability 
that are near rather than far from the mean or expected value. We sus- 
pect that it might be possible to account for some of the present results 
by assuming that Ss are attempting to hold some other measure of 
variability constant, but we have not been able to derive any simple re- 
lation between the best-fitting exponent applied to deviations from EV 
and the slope relating log P(I--P) to log (A- B). Our intuition is 
that the slope should become flatter as the deviation exponent decreases. 
Whatever the relation between dispersion preferences and information 
purchase, Ss in the present experiments made tradeoffs that treated 
probability as relatively more important than stakes. And the control 
condition in Experiment 2, which switched independent and dependent 
variables, indicates that this relation cannot be accounted for by a part- 
ial sensitivity on the part of Ss. The slope of the regression line was 
essentially the same, regardless of whether stakes or probability was 
treated as the independent variable. But more interesting than the 
general nature of the tradeoff is the fact that it depended upon S's pro- 
pensity for taking risks. I t  seems congruent with common sense that  the 
riskier S, who tended to choose higher average stakes and smaller average 
probabilities of a correct decision, was characterized by a flatter slope, 
i.e., tended to deemphasize stakes relative to probability. This behavior 
is consistent with the viewpoint tha t  it is the conservative rather than the 
risky person who focusses on stakes. He prefers not to gamble and is 
willing to purchase an insurance policy in order to avoid a small chance 
of a large loss. l i e  will pay in terms of the net expected value in order 
to reduce his perceived level of risk. This seems to be a reasonable in- 
terpretation of why one person would be willing to purchase more infor- 
marion than another person, especially in the range where the EV 
function is flat. 
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